The most important development in international corporate governance in the past 20 years has been the privatization of state-owned enterprises. There is evidence that privatization has resulted in improved firm performance but the source of this improvement is difficult to isolate. We argue that one of the most important results of privatization for corporate governance is the potential entry of those firms into the market for corporate control as targets and bidders, which can result in improved firm performance for numerous reasons. We document the magnitude and the wealth effects of the mergers of privatized firms, attempting to find every privatized firm that was either a target or a bidder in a merger. We find 52 privatized firms that subsequently become targets of takeovers and 90 privatized firms that became bidders in 341 mergers. In general, we find that privatized firms operate very much as non-privatized firms have in the market for corporate control. Target firms experience a 12 percent increase in equity value at the announcement of a merger. Bidding firms experience a positive but insignificant change in equity value at merger announcement. The results indicate that mergers result in net wealth creation for privatized firms and are indicative that one effect of privatization is wealth-creating mergers.
Introduction
The most important development in international corporate governance in the past 20 years has been the transfer of ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from governments to private ownership, a process called privatization by Margaret Thatcher. A large literature has studied the effects of privatization on firm performance -see, for example, the surveys by Megginson and Netter (2001) , Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Denis and McConnell (2003) . The empirical evidence generally concludes that privatization improves firm performance. However, while there are numerous theoretical arguments for why performance improves after privatization, empirically there is limited evidence on the sources of the gains from privatization. In this paper, we analyze whether the market for corporate control is one source of the post-privatization improvements in performance. Historically, government-owned firms were rarely involved in the market for corporate control either as bidders or targets. Thus, a major impact of privatization is the potential for participation in the market for corporate control as a target, a bidder, or both. 1 The entry (or the potential for entry) into the market for corporate control has been shown in previous studies to result in improved firm performance and the same result can occur for privatized firms.
Our research design specifically addresses a central question posed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.774) at the conclusion of their survey on corporate governance: what are the political dynamics of corporate governance? By examining privatized firms, we focus on a major change in the political control environment. Then, in studying the subsequent takeovers, we analyze how the decision-making of the privatized firm evolves in response to its new environment.
Our analysis considers the extent that privatized firms are involved in merger activity and the impact of this activity on investors. Our goal is to use the universe of corporate control activity of privatized firms. Thus, we have limited amount of statistical tests based on sampling. In an intuitive sense we are examining one event -privatized firms in the market for corporate control. Overall, we find that privatized firms have entered the market for corporate control much as non-privatized firms have. While we include all privatized firms, since we view the event as a worldwide event, the results hold for most cross-sectional divisions of the cases such as European vs. non-European.
The result that privatized firms enter the market for corporate control and investors view this transaction much as they do for other firms is a simple yet very strong result. Our analysis of a relatively new phenomenon allows understanding of how corporate governance has evolved amidst the international changes of the past 20 years.
Our evidence suggests that privatized firms have significantly entered the market for corporate control both as bidders and targets in wealth creating transactions (although at a slightly lower rate of entry than comparison firms). We find 52 privatized firms that subsequently become targets of a takeover and 90 privatized firms that became bidders in 341 mergers. We estimate the wealth effects at the announcement of the mergers for the sample firms. Under the hypothesis of a semi-strong efficient market, these announcement effects provide an estimate of investors' perceptions of the post-merger changes in productivity. Hence, our research design enables us to determine the extent to which the market for corporate control is a relevant factor for privatized entities. Our results indicate that privatized target firms experience a 12 percent increase in equity value at the announcement of a merger. The bidding firms experience a positive but insignificant change in equity value at merger announcement. Thus, mergers result in net wealth creation for privatized firms that are targets and do not destroy wealth for bidding firms. Our results also suggest that one effect of privatization is the increased likelihood that a privatized firm will enter into wealth-creating mergers and this effect helps to explain the success of the privatization movement. Our findings are consistent with the large empirical evidence on takeovers in the U.S. and the developing literature on international takeovers.
The dynamic interaction between privatization and takeovers that we study appears to be part of an important trend in non-US economies. In their review of the empirical literature on corporate governance, Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003, pp. 50-51) note that takeovers (especially hostile takeovers) historically have not had an important role in corporate control in countries outside the US and UK. But these authors also observe that several recent high-profile takeovers in Europe involved newly privatized firms. Hence, the changes in the political setting outside the US both facilitates our empirical analysis and also heightens the importance of understanding the interaction between the various control forces facing international corporations.
We view the ongoing changes outside the US as a natural laboratory with which to gain new insights on corporate governance. In this respect, we heed the call by Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) to take advantage of the controlled experiments provided by regulatory change in Europe to improve our empirical understanding of governance factors. While Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) point to changing rules on outside directors as an example of exogenous regulatory change in corporate governance, our emphasis is on the changes brought about by privatization and takeovers.
In Section 2, we overview the issues and review our methodology. In section 3, we discuss the data. In section 4, we outline our results and conclude in section 5.
Overview and Methodology

Background of the Analysis
Our study aims to improve our understanding of the importance of the different control mechanisms facing corporations in Europe and throughout the world after a period of profound change in corporate governance. As summarized by Jensen (1993) , four distinct forces operate on corporations: capital markets, the legal/political/regulatory system, products and factor markets, and internal control systems.
A large body of theoretical and empirical research has studied these corporate control forces and we will not review it here. The underlying theoretical model for our analysis comes from the literature on property rights and agency costs. Alchian (1977) presents the central point when he argues that behavior under government and private ownership differs not because of different objectives but instead due to differing costreward systems. Following this line of thought, Alchian (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1979) argue that a distinguishing feature between government and private ownership is that the interests in the private sector are transferable between investors. As a specific application, Manne (1965) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) note that this transfer of ownership facilitates the market for corporate control where existing corporate officers are monitored by the explicit and implicit competition of other management teams. A central prediction of the property rights/agency cost theory is that the monitoring and restructuring facilitated by the market for corporate control improves firm productivity and contributes to shareholder wealth maximization. We test this prediction by analyzing whether the corporate control transactions of privatized firms are wealth enhancing.
In addition to providing evidence on the effects of privatization, the setting for our study also provides a distinct test of theories on the wealth effects of merger activity.
Stated broadly, one collection of theories (e.g., Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) ) posits that mergers occur for efficiency reasons. By contrast, another set of theories (e.g., Jensen
(1986), Roll (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ) argues that mergers can be inefficient because they reflect attempts at entrenchment or hubris by bidders' management, to create monopoly power or to redistribute wealth from other stakeholders.
Finally, others argue that mergers result from mispricings in the capital markets (see Shleifer and Vishny (2001) ).
Since theory posits many possible causes of mergers, empirical evidence must be used to determine which causes predominate in different situations. Grinblatt and Titman (2001, p. 729 ) summarize the empirical evidence by saying, "we cannot say whether mergers, on average create value." They go on to suggest that some mergers create value while others destroy value either because of mistakes or misinformation. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2000) note that mergers create value at their announcement, with most of the gains going to target shareholders. They suggest this is not surprising because a merger is an investment decision and it is hard to earn consistent economic rents in "a competitive economy with a fairly efficient capital market." Bruner (2004) in summarizing the evidence on mergers from studies using returns to shareholders (mainly from the U.S.) as a measure, concludes that the evidence is that mergers and acquisitions do pay on average. Hietala, Kaplan and Robinson (2003) suggest caution in the use of event studies, however, because it is difficult to isolate the impact of the deal versus other information about the merging firms.
Our data provides a test of the wealth effects of mergers based on a unique international dataset -bidders and targets who were recently SOEs, with all the incentive problems present in SOE's (see Megginson and Netter (2001, 328-331) and Gupta (2004) for a review of the issues 
Methodology
The empirical evidence on the effects of government versus private ownership has generally relied on accounting data, using different datasets with cross-country and time- conditions are key to firm performance, it is generally impossible to find publicly owned companies to match with SOEs or former SOEs. In addition, matching SOEs with analogous firms by pre-privatization performance outside the country of the firm being studied is very difficult. Finally, there may be a significant sample selection bias in analyzing firms that are privatized since governments may choose to privatize the better performing firms.
An important feature of our work is that we rely on stock price information rather than accounting data. Stock price data is more meaningful than accounting data in large part because it is not subject to interpretation or manipulation. The methodology we use, a short-window event study, is well-developed, methodologically sound and, in Fama's (1991, p. 1600) words, "passes the test of scientific usefulness." Additionally, as argued by Fama (1991 Fama ( , 1998 , the short-window event-study procedure that we employ is more scientifically robust than the longer-run analyses of equity performance. As Bruner This analysis contrasts two main theories, efficiency and entrenchment.
Efficiency theories (e.g., Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983, 1988) ) posit that takeovers enable a profitable realignment of resources while entrenchment theories (e.g., Jensen
(1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ) argue that takeovers allow the managers of bidding firms to benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholders through empire building.
To distinguish the theories in our analysis, a focal point will be the returns to the privatized firms that become bidders. While both sets of theories predict that takeovers will be associated with positive returns to target shareholders, the efficiency theories predict that bidder returns will be non-negative while the entrenchment theories predict that bidder returns will be negative.
The bulk of the evidence in prior research from the US indicates that targets gain in takeovers and that bidders break even. See, for example, Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) , and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) . These results tend to support the efficiency theory. However, recent research by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) finds losses to large bidders in the latter part of the 1990s, suggesting evidence counter to an efficiency explanation for mergers. Because our sample covers the 1990 to 2001 period and comes from a setting outside the US, we can add new evidence on the efficiency and entrenchment theories.
Indeed, the setting that we study provides a unique laboratory with which to study the wealth effects of takeovers. Privatization is a dramatic event for a corporation. The incentive structure of the firm becomes much different, and the freedom of management to make decisions is also altered. Within this setting, property rights theory such as
Alchian (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1979) would argue that the new decision making environment will led to efficient takeovers. On the other hand, it is certainly plausible that the vestiges of government operations will sway takeover decisions toward the entrenchment and empire building modeled by Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989) .
While we argue that the entry of privatized firms into the market for corporate control is one event, we do split the firms into different groups to see if our general findings for the whole hold. This includes portioning by method of payment, public status of target, year, country, and industry. In general our results are very similar for each group, further supporting our view that we can treat the entry of these firms into the market for corporate control as one case at least in terms of the wealth effects.
In addition to providing novel tests of different takeover theories, our research design also offers new analysis of the performance effects of privatization. By studying the wealth effects of a major corporate decision following privatization, we can obtain direct estimates as to whether privatization is associated with improved performance. Our analysis of performance based on stock prices complements the existing analysis of the performance of privatized firms that employs accounting measures of performance.
As an additional gauge of performance, we can also examine the attributes of the target firms between the time that they are privatized and the time that they engage in takeover activity. Relative to a benchmark sample of privatized firms, do the targets tend to be under-performers (suggesting a disciplinary motive for the takeover) or do the targets have normal performance in an industry undergoing changes in its product or factor markets (suggesting an efficiency motive for the takeover)? Evidence will provide insights as to the interaction of privatization and the takeover market and will also help to understand the cross-sectional effects within our sample that we develop in detail in the following section.
Data
Our analysis studies the takeover activity of as many privatized firms as possible.
We use the set of privatized firms developed by Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2004) . They argue their selection methodology, which includes obtaining data on privatizations from numerous private and public sources, makes as complete a possible collection of privatizations as feasible (see their paper for details of the sample collection process). We then use that list of firms to compare with the data on merged firms from Securities Data Corporation. Our goal is obtain all corporate control transactions. As we discuss below we are interested in whether the firm was involved in a takeover, the characteristics of the firm, and the stock price reaction.
Data Concerns
In section 2, we discussed methodological difficulties that arise in studies of privatization. In addition to methodological difficulties, the quality of international data is uneven and almost always below the quality of analogous data in the U.S. This may introduce biases that are difficult to detect and that have uncertain effects. First, international data, especially accounting data, is not as good as U.S. data. The U.S. has more stringent disclosure rules than almost any other country, and the rules are more effectively enforced in the U.S. than anywhere else. In fact, the emerging literature on the effectiveness of different governance systems indicates that the disclosure rules and the enforcement of the rules by the SEC and private parties in private party suits are an important reason U.S. capital markets work well. To the extent that accounting numbers are inaccurate or even manipulated, measurement of performance changes is suspect. For example, Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find differences in earnings management across countries, although there is some evidence that the differences are shrinking as is the level of earnings management.
A related problem is that the data compilation services for international firms are not as complete or as accurate as that available for U.S. firms from CRSP and Compustat. Presumably, the missing firms are smaller or from less developed countries, which introduces sample selection bias. More importantly, there is some evidence that the price data are not complete. For example, in several cases Datastream reports unchanged prices for significant periods. This suggests the possibility that there was no trading during that period. However, in cross checking the data with other sources we do find indications of trading during these periods. Further, the periods for which data were not available (often weeks or months) are longer than would be expected for non-trading. We might expect this problem to be greater for firms in developing countries, introducing sample selection bias. However, we do find missing data for developed countries such as the UK and New Zealand, also.
We deal with the data reporting problems by deleting any firms that appear to have suspicious price data. This reduces our sample size by about 30. While we were able to examine the data closely because of our relatively small sample, it becomes more difficult as more data from more sources are used in research and larger samples are used.
(Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) also discuss difficulties with using cross-national data).
Nevertheless, we believe that our data are very "clean." The data that are available are useful, but researchers examining results from international firms need to consider the problems in the data.
Another potential problem is due to difficulties in identifying firms and limited coverage by SDC resulting in the possibility that we may not identify all merger transactions. We find 72 privatized firms involved in mergers (four of our bidders also became targets). We begin with a sample of more than 400 privatized firms and thus about 15% of the privatized firms were also involved in mergers. We do not know the rate of mergers internationally but this does not appear to be low by U.S. standards. Table 1 takeover. Thus, while comparison is difficult since many of the firms were not privatized until the mid-1990s, the data suggest that even though privatized firms were not in the M&A market as much as firms in the U.S., many privatized firms were still directly in the market for corporate control. Note also that the potential for being in market for corporate control will impact most of the privatized firms even if they were not acquired or bought another firm. were not potential takeover targets. As a privately held firm, however, they became a target, subject to the market for corporate control, and the resulting premium to target shareholders in a merger. Table 2 also reports abnormal stock returns for bidders at merger announcements. samples. There is no evidence that former SOEs as private firms are more prone to make bad acquisitions than U.S. firms
Results
We do not compute combined returns for the target and the bidder in the event study analysis of takeovers involving privatized for both a theoretical and practical reason. Theoretically, we are interested in returns to the investors in the privatized firm, not the firm that acquired it or that was acquired by a privatized firm. As a practical matter, computing combined target and acquirer returns is very difficult due to significant missing data. Only 27% of privatized firms that become bidders acquire a public company as defined by SDC so for most of these takeovers there are no combined returns to calculate. About 85% of privatized targets are acquired by public bidders. The term "public," as defined by SDC, does not necessarily mean "listed" nor is price data always available on Datastream for these firms. For the sample of privatized targets, price data is available for only 80% of the bidding firms.
In the next set of tables, we separate the sample by method of payment, industry, and country. We do not use regression analysis since there are not enough observations to estimate a meaningful regression explaining returns. We also note that in general, regressions explaining bidder returns in cross sections have trivial explanatory power.
In Tables 3, 3a , and 3b we classify the target and bidder returns by method of payment (Table 3) , public status of the target (3a), and whether the target had a golden share (3b). The results for each of these different classifications are similar to the results for all firms. It appears that the returns to targets are higher when the deal is cash than stock, but in both cases it is positive. There is no difference in bidder returns by method of payment or status of target (private or public firm). We find the highest returns for the four targets where we determined that the government had a golden share (allowing veto of a merger). In three of the four cases the return was more than 20%. Presumably, the golden share gave the target more bargaining power in the bid.
In Table 4 , we report the numbers of mergers by year as well as the wealth effects by year. The bulk of the observations occur in 1995 and later. There does not appear to be any pattern in the returns in the mergers over the years. Table 5 reports the industry make-up of the sample. There are 31 industries represented in the sample. In terms of wealth effects to bidders and targets, no real pattern is evident. For targets, the largest industry representation is from utilities, banking, and insurance. For bidders, the mostrepresented industries are telecommunications, petroleum and natural gas, and banking.
For both bidders and targets, the data suggest that the takeover activity of privatized firms tends to cluster in particular industries. (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) report similar concentrations for U.S. mergers.) However, it may be because these are the industries where privatized firms operate Thus, as a more specific benchmark of the clustering of takeover activity by privatized firms, Table 5a compares the industry distribution of our target and bidder samples with that of a broader sample of share issue privatizations found in Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) . To facilitate the comparison, we condensed the industries in Table 5a into five groups.
The data in Table 5a suggest that the takeover activity of privatized firms does cluster in certain industries, as compared to the broader industry representation of privatized firms. The takeover activity of privatized targets disproportionately occurs in the financial and utilities sectors in comparison with the industries where privatization occurred. The takeover activity of privatized bidders is relatively large in the telecommunications sector. These three industries -financial, utilities, and telecommunications -also had significant takeover activity in the United States during the 1990s, a phenomenon attributed to deregulation. (See, Mulherin and Boone (2000) , and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) .) Hence, privatization outside the US appears to have a similar interaction with takeover activity as does deregulation within the US. Table 6 reports the distribution of the firms in our analysis across countries. The targets and bidders come from a wide variety of countries. Again it is hard to see a pattern especially given the limited number of observations from each country. In terms of numbers, the largest incidence of both targets and bidders comes from the United Kingdom. For targets, no other country has more than 10 percent of the sample. For bidders, France, Spain and China also have a noticeable presence in the sample. Table 7 re-examines the gains to bidders and targets as a function of country affiliation. Mergers are classified as intra-country if the target and bidder come from the same country and are classified as cross-border if the target and bidder are from different countries. As reported in Table 7 , the results do not vary substantially from the evidence for the full sample. The CARs for intra-country and cross-border targets (reported for the 5-day event window) are both positive and significantly different from zero. The CARs for the bidders in the two sub-samples both remain positive but insignificant. The results indicate that, on average, both within-country and across-country mergers create wealth.
In Table 7a , we examine three other factors that may affect returns -years since the privatization occurred, government ownership at the time of the transaction, and whether the firm had a golden share (to the extent we can determine that). It does appear that for the targets that had been privatized fewer than three years, there is a smaller return (1.9%) than for targets that had been privatized more than three years before the merger. Government ownership does not appear to be related to returns to bidders and targets. Finally, the presence of a golden share does seem to increase target returns.
In Table 8 , we attempt to test whether privatized targets became targets because they had performed badly (as measured by ROA or ROE), or had expenditure or debt levels (as measured by capital expenditures/sales, debt/assets, dividend payout) that might lead to a merger. We compare these firms to what Megginson, Nash, and Randenborgh ( 1994) had found for privatized firms in general. We find no evidence the targets had performed worse than the privatized firms in general, or had differences in capital expenditures or dividend payouts. We do observe, however, that the privatized targets had a substantially lower debt/asset ratio than privatized firms in general. In general, we find little evidence that the takeovers were disciplining poorly performing firms.
As a whole, the results indicate that mergers create wealth for privatized firms. As SOEs, these firms were insulated from the market for corporate control. After privatization, target firms experience a positive change in equity value, which is real evidence of a source of gains in privatization. There is a slight positive but insignificant increase in bidding firms' value at the announcement. The net positive change in value is consistent with the view that privatization leads to productivity improvements.
Summary and Concluding Comments
In this paper we study the interaction between privatization and the market for corporate control. We find that the merger of privatized entities results in wealth creation.
The sample of privatized targets experiences a significant appreciation in equity value, while the bidder firms have a positive but insignificant change in equity value. The net increase in value is consistent with future improvements in productivity for the privatized firms that become involved in mergers. These results are consistent with theories in the property rights/agency cost tradition.
Beyond the specific area of privatization, our results are consistent with theories that associate mergers with improvements in efficiency. The shareholders in target firms benefit from exposure to the market for corporate control. On the bidder side, the bidding firms in our sample were formerly government owned, and one might expect the firms to be especially subject to management entrenchment or hubris. However, the results indicate that the bidding firms in the sample do not suffer losses in value at the announcement of the mergers. These results are consistent with a competitive market for corporate control.
The most important development in corporate governance in Europe and the world in the past 20 years has been privatization of formerly state owned enterprises. One major impact of privatization is the potential for participation in the market for corporate control as a target, a bidder, or both. We show this has occurred and resulted in wealth creation. This table reports the wealth effects at the announcement of the mergers of the firms in the target sample and the bidder sample. The wealth effects are estimated from the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of the mergers, where the abnormal return for a given day is ARi = Ri -Rm, where Ri is the return for firm i and Rm is the return for the S&P Composite Index. The cumulative abnormal return [CAR] is the sum of the abnormal returns for a given firm over a given event period. Estimates are provided for the mean CARs in the 5-day [-2,+2] period and the 11-day [-5,+5] period around the merger announcement, where Day 0 is the date of the merger announcement as determined from Lexis-Nexis. Each cell below reports the mean and median CARs as well as the t-statistic of the test of the null that the mean CAR is equal to zero. 
Announcement Period Targets Bidders
Target Golden Share Description from Lexis-Nexis at the time of takeover announcement CAR
Elf Aquitaine Special share held by the French government allows it to prevent anyone from acquiring more than 10% of the company.
23.3%
Celsius AB Swedish parliament must approve the sale of the state's 25% stake.
28.0%
YPF SA The Argentine government holds a golden share in YPF, but is in favor of the bid. The YPF board is not in favor of the bid.
27.8%
Irish Life PLC The Irish government holds a golden share allowing it to block any takeover. This table presents accounting ratios that proxy for profitability, investment, leverage and dividends. The first two ratios measure profitability. They are return on assets and return on common equity measured as net income divided by total assets and common equity, respectively. The fourth ratio measures the level of investment as capital expenditures divided by total revenues. The fifth ratio measures leverage as total debt divided by total assets. The final column shows the dividend payout ratio measured as dividends paid divided by net income. The first five rows represent years relative to the acquisition, where year zero is the year of the acquisition. The sixth row presents results for the average metric of the target for the three years (-3 to -1) leading up to the year of the takeover announcement (year 0). The last row presents empirical results from Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) using the same methodology. In each cell the first number is the median, the number in brackets is the average, and the final number represents the sample size. 
10.7%
ROA
